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Law Review
A closer look at law: human rights as multi-level sites of struggles
over multi-dimensional equality
Susanne Baer*

In many societies, deep conflicts arise around religious matters, and around equality. Often,
religious collectives demand the right to self-determination of issues considered - by them - to
be their own, and these demands collide with individual rights to, again, religious freedom. These
are thus conflicts of religion v. religion. Then, collective religious freedom tends to become an
obligation for all those who are defined as belonging to the collective, which carries the problem
that mostly elites define its meaning and they silence dissent. Usually, such obligations are also
unequal relating to gender, with different regimes for women and for men, and transgender
identities fail to be recognized entirely. Examples include not only the Muslim headscarf, Jewish
yarmulke or Sikh turban cases, but also the cases around swimming lessons or litigation for
prayer time at school which I use as focal points in this paper. And, at present, such conflicts
surface in surprising numbers. Therefore, I will place them in discussions of constitutionalism,
secularism, multi-level regulation, and, of course, religious freedom and equality. With this
multi-layered analysis, I propose to seek a deeper understanding of these struggles, beyond a
portrayal of them as mere clashes of rights. Such an understanding needs the tools of discourse
analysis, in that it should uncover which rights are claimed by whom with which effect on whom.
We need to acknowledge that rights are often an issue, since human rights are a point of reference
both for moral claims as well as for political suppositions, used as illustrations in many academic
fields way beyond legal studies. But often, turning to rights does not do justice to the law.
Instead, we need to understand law's specificities, as regulation, and decentre law,' simultaneously. Then, any doctrinal response to conflicts of religion and equality may be grounded in
what is usually called a socio-legal analysis, and what I would call a reflexive understanding of
the law. Based on this, I propose to search for solutions to the conflicts by relying on individual
and not on collective fundamental rights read in the light of each other, with substantive equality
as one corner of a fundamental rights triangle.
1. Introduction
Today, there is an abundance of conflicts surrounding religious freedom throughout the world.
To many societies, states, courts, and scholars, these are not entirely new. What some see as a
*
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policy against Islam after 9/11 has historical predecessors in policies against Catholicism. There
have also been court cases in which religion and equality did collide in the past. However, we
seem to frame these differently today. This is why I suggest not only to think about religion and
come to terms with belief in light of, say, sex equality, but to think about these conflicts in the
context of contested secularism, as an occurrence in a world of multi-level (and thus also
contested) regulation, and as a problem of multiple inequalities.
First, religion is back on the agenda, but it is enculturalized, and treated as a group issue,
which brings with it a host of problems. In addition, secularism is at stake.2 This is not so much
the case when collective religious identities already officially form nation states, as in the case
of an Islamic Republic, the Jewish State of Israel, in some way Britain with the Anglican Church,
or the Vatican. Then, one could argue, we saw some conflicts with minority religions and
equality coming. But we observe these conflicts also in states which claim to be and have been
mostly seen as secular. These are the more unexpected and more complex conflicts, where it is
not the state that explicitly endorses a religion, but when it is social groups in whose name a
collective right is claimed, in the context of proclaimed state secularism. Religion is back, one
could say in such settings, in rather interesting ways, on the thought-to-be secular agenda. Often,
this is subject to controversies around the very notion of the secular, or secularism, or
constitutionalism as a secular regime. The varying presence of religion can also be understood
as a specific instance of agenda setting, true to an understanding of law as a discursive activity
in regulation.
Second, equality is, also in a problematic way, pushed onto a mainstream agenda. In many
places, conflicts around religion are described as and reduced to clashes between Islam and
women's rights. The headscarf, niqab or burka controversies, reaching from Turkey to France,
the Netherlands, and Germany, are discussed, by many, as a problem which Islam has with sex
equality, as are the conflicts around Shari'a family law and other religious personal status,
marriage or divorce norms in several other countries.' So sex equality, or feminism, is, in rather
interesting ways as well, on the agenda very prominently, and often that prominent in the
mainstream for the first time.
Third, it is a problematic version of equality, or in fact, a claim of a difference, which is
back in such settings, while the conflicts in fact call for a more nuanced understanding of equality
to address multiple inequalities. What we see is that religion and equality do not peacefully
coexist. But what we need is a better understanding of both rights to find legal answers to
conflicts at hand.
Fourth, rules are challenged and it is then obviously insufficient to claim but one right or
only one principle to address the conflicts at hand. Beyond a better understanding of these rights
and principles, we need to understand the multiple levels of regulation and thus the plurality of
2

3

4

By secularism, I invoke the concept according to which societies are secular if there is a secularized political sphere, thus a basic separation
of state and church. I do not discuss a Weberian notion of secularisation which informs modernization. That this is no causal connection is
evident in the case of the United States, a rather religious yet modem society, and seems to be a widely accepted consensus in sociological
discussions of the topic.
See, for example, the special issue of the Women 's Studies InternationalForum on Islam, 2006, and for an overview regarding different

religions and human rights N. Ghanea et al., Does God Believe in Human Rights?:Essays on Religion andHuman Rights, 2007. For a brief
comment on Germany, see S. Baer, 'Religionsfreiheit und Gleichberechtigung', in H. Bielefeld et al. (eds.), Religionsfreiheit- Jahrbuch
Menschenrechte 2009, 2008, pp. 105-115. A thoughtful Swiss perspective on constitutionalism is offered by W. Kilin, Grundrechte im
Kulturkonfliki, 2000; Th. Fleiner & L. Basta Fleiner, ConstitutionalDemocracy in a Multiculturaland Globalised World, 2009.
In Egypt, the focal point is Art. 2 of the Constitution which endorses Islamic law. The Supreme Constitutional Court has held that this can
only refer to principles of law which are uncontested in Islam, and not to the many rules where different interpretations exist. See Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt, Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996), annotated translation by N. Brown & C. Lombardi,
2006American U. InternationalL.Rev. 21, pp. 437-460 (religious garb ofpupils). See also P. Fournier, 'Flirting with God in Western Secular
Courts: Mahr in the West', 2010 InternationalJournal ofLaw, Policy and the Family 24, pp. 1-28.
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rules which govern a case. In this global legal environment, I will however argue that we should
not return to a traditional public-private distinction which is back on the agenda, too, yet
particularly problematic.
I start the discussion with an analysis of the discussions we have, the frames which are
employed to mark conflicts within human rights. To illustrate the problem, I will then discuss
some cases, and eventually return to the frames, but in what I hope to be a more nuanced
understanding of them. The cases refer to headscarves, swimming lessons and prayer at school
and they made it to the courts in Germany as well as in other countries, of which I will mention
the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. What are we, in light of all the layers I invoke, to think
of these?
2. Political agenda setting: religion and sex equality
Conflicts around religion and equality are conflicts in human rights with a specific flavour, and
it is a flavour added in larger political discourse. It gives legal discussions of cases in the area a
specific taste, too. So before I discuss legal cases, I will briefly outline the most relevant
discursive dynamics in the area. First, there is the culturalization of religion, which implies
groupism as a dangerous dynamic. Then, there is the othering of sex inequality, which uses
religion or culture as a stigma to shield a majority from critique and change. In addition, there
is a problematic mainstream frame of tolerance, and fetishism around law.
2.1. 'Enculturalizing' religion and groupism
In many societies perceived or portrayed as secular, and after times in which religion was not a
prior concern for scholars outside of this field of specialty, religion is back on the agenda. There
are many factors which give rise to this, and I will name just three of them. One causal factor is
certainly the terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid and London, the murder of a film-maker in the
Netherlands, death threats to cartoonists and newspaper editors in Denmark - all associated with
Islamist terror. Another factor is global migration, with more people of diverse religious beliefs
in societies which were dominated by one or few religions and which had generously granted
privileges they may not be willing to grant to the newly arrived. Religious diversity is not new
to states like India, but it is certainly new to many Western and Eastern European states. In
addition, religion has made it back to our agendas because of several calls for it, be it the
emphasis on values forcefully articulated by moral minorities which even succeed in being
labelled 'Moral Majority', or be it problematic binary constructions of clashes between cultures,
or be it diagnoses of modern societies as lacking guidance and orientation for people, estranging
them, creating a need for community, rituals, or metaphysics.
So there are reasons why religion is back and no wonder it is a hot topic in theoretical
discussions and academic contexts concerned with secular varieties of power, like political theory
and political science, social and legal philosophy, sociology and legal studies. One catalytic
moment may be the debate between the social philosopher JIrgen Habermas and the now Pope
and then Cardinal Ratzinger, while others would refer to the study of secularism by the political
theorist Charles Taylor,6 by the sociologist Jos6 Casanova' or the critical account by Talal Asad.'
5
6
7
8

J. Habermas & J. Kardinal Ratzinger, Dialektik der Sikularisierung,2005.
Ch. Taylor, A Secular Age, 2007; see also Ch. Taylor et al. (eds.), Secularism, Religion and MudticulturalCitizenship, 2008.
J. Casanova, 'Public Religions Revisited', in N. De Vries (ed.), Religion Beyonda Concept, 2008, pp. 101-119; J. Casanova, PublicReligions
in the Modern World, 1994.
T. Asad, Formationsof the Secular: Christianity,Islam, Modernity, 2003.
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In legal studies, the comparative constitutionalist and currently the European Court of Human
Rights Justice Andras Saj6 recently restarted the debate.' So we observe a return of a topic which
has been a starting point for much theory in the field, but has been considered less relevant in the
last 50 years or so. Note that Karl Marxo and Emile Durkheim, " and then most prominently Max
Weberl2 started, more or less explicitly, the sociological study of law, states, and administrations
with a clear albeit not always explicit investment in religion, in Weber's case more specifically
despite its universal tone, German Protestantism. Thereafter, sociologists have devoted attention
to religion as one sub-system of our societies, such as the systems theoretician Niklas Luhmann.13
But mainstream political theory and legal studies have, in the late 20th century, not spent much
time on religion. Put differently, secularization infected theory, but it did not result in the end of
religion. So religion is back.
However, nothing ever returns to a discursive agenda unchanged. Today, religion mostly
appears dressed up. Specifically, it appears in the guise of culture, which, in turn, is often a guise
of ethnicity, and eventually, though clouded in taboo, racism.14 When people argue in defence
of cultural pluralism, it is often religion which is at stake. When people defend problematic
versions of multicultural politics, affirming the difference of 'cultures' rather than emphasizing
commonalities and cooperation, such strategies often endorse a stereotyping of the 'other', which
is, often, a religion, and ultimately paternalistic and racist, politics. 15 At the same time, many
discussions of religious pluralism explicitly employ multiculturalism or cultural diversity as a
normative frame.16 Religion is then, in specific ways, 'enculturalized'. This is not just a problem
of confusing terminology. It also invites additional concerns. The most problematic is what
Rogers Brubaker has defined as 'groupism'. He describes this as one dimension of nationalism,
and as a problematic element of claims of national self-determination."
More generally, groupism characterizes any claim by any collective." Whenever a 'culture'
or a 'religion' claims recognition, we have the problem of reification, in that this suggests that
the culture or religion is homogenous. We also usually have the problem of elitism, since and
when such collective claims are not defined by all members of the relevant entity. In addition,
as Brubaker notes, we have the problem of mapping the world in exclusionary blocs. Thus,
groupism is what is wrong with identity politics, an observation theorized in critical race,
feminist and gay studies extensively." Now I suggest considering groupism also as a problem

9

A. Salo, 'Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism', 2008 INTL J. CONST L. (]*CON) 6, pp. 605-629.

10 K. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's PhilosophyofRight, 1843 ('Die Religion (...) ist das Opium des Volkes', translated as religion is 'opium of
the people).
11 E. Durkheim, Die elementaren Formen des religiosenLebens, 2005 (first published in 1912, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,
transl. K. Fields, 1995).
12 M. Weber, Die protestantischeEthik und der 'Geist'des Kapitalismus,2006 (first published in journals in 1904/05, The ProtestantEthic
and the Spirit of Capitalism,reprint edited by T. Parsons, 2003) (arguing that a specific modern rationality results from Protestant ethics).
13 N. Luhmann, Die Religion der Gesellschaft, 1997.
14 Compare M. Chon & D. Arzt, 'Walking While Muslim'. 2005 Law, and Contemporary Problems, pp. 215-254, more generally
R. Frankenberg (ed.), Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism, 1997.
15 M. Dustin & A. Phillips, 'Whose agenda is it?: abuses of women and abuses of "culture" in Britain', 2008 Ethnicities, pp. 405-424;
M. Verloo, 'Multiple inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union', 2006 European Journal of Women s Studies, pp. 211-228
(discussing the Netherlands).
16 M. Deveaux, GenderandJusticein MulticulturalLiberalStates, 2006; J. Tully, StrangeMuliplicity: ConstitutionalisminanAge ofDiversity,
1995; A. Phillipps, Multiculturalism ithout Culture, 2007.
17 R. Brubaker, Ethnicity w1ithout Groups, 2006. Also note the patterns of wars fought in the name of religions; H. Kippenberg, Gevalt als
Gottesdienst.Religionskriege im Zeitalter der Globalisierung,2008.
18 Brubaker observes that it has however only been an issue in relation to certain groups, and not others, in St. May et al. (eds.), Ethnicity,
Nationalism, and Minority Rights, 2004, pp. 51-52.
19 Le., K. Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color', in K. Crenshaw et al.
(eds.), CriticalRace Theory: The Key Writings That Formedthe Movement, 1995, p. 357.
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of rights. Then, groupism is what is wrong with claims of collectives, a challenge I will return
to below.
Let me illustrate the problem of groupism in the context of human rights. It starts with the
problem of who is considered a collective which deserves recognition, as a religion, or a culture
in need of minority rights or, if it is a political majority, to inform a nation, or a disadvantaged
group in need of affirmative action. Consider the list of specified inequalities in constitutions or
human rights treaties as well as in other rules to regulate equality: who is mentioned, and who
agrees to mention who? Regarding religion, many regulatory regimes recognize religion as such.
But also, states have mechanisms in place to decide which one will enjoy the privileges which
may come with it. For example, Germany has granted many privileges to churches and now
withholds these from Muslim communities because, officials state, the religion of Islam is not
organized in a way that the state has a representative to talk to. Here, the state creates a representational requirement which suits its need to not only talk, but also to govern, control, and in fact
follow the pattern of state-church relations established with Catholics and Protestants, rather than
accepting a difference when religions work in different ways. Legally, groupism thus translates
into rights, or the denial of rights, of very specific collectives.
In addition, groupism in human rights means modelling people to conform to standards
which human rights should allow to contest, to dissent from. Consider minority rights, where
'minorities' are often limited to designate mostly rather well-established, visible groups within
nation states. 2 0 Consider nations, where collectives form the hegemonic legal regime. In religious
matters, as the German example illustrates, states have religious communities conforming to their
model, although religious communities are organized in very different forms of governance.
Sects differ from other religious communities, and traditional religious associations may differ
from recent offsprings of larger established ones. Therefore, models of group representation and
minority models of group rights do not work in more heterogeneous settings.
The even more problematic aspect of groupism in law is, however, that a collective
freedom tends to trump individual rights. The political theorist Susan Okin made that point when
asking whether 'Multiculturalism is Bad for Women', an argument which has been refined since
then.2 1 Many are by now aware of the problem of internal minorities.22 In addition, and a bit more
complicated, feminist and antiracist and gay studies of and in law have espoused the problem that
even equality law suffers from groupism, although it is meant to undo its harmful effects.
Groupism reigns when inequalities are constructed as problems of groups, as in most talk of
affirmative action. Law protects us against groupism only when inequalities are seen as problems
of attributing group characteristics, what may be called stereotyping or stigmatizing. Doctrinally,
groupism is another problematic effect of symmetrical, Aristotelian equality analysis, in that this
needs fixed units to compare, to similarly situate. Instead, equality is a right against groupism if
it is understood as asymmetrical and substantive, a difference I return to below.
Regarding religion, the difference is one between a concept of religious freedom tied to a
collective and religious freedom as an individual right which may eventually be turned against
hegemonic claims within a religious community. To be sure, an individual right is a right of
20 See more generally, J. De Groof& J. Fiers (eds.) The LegalStatus of Minorities in Education, 2002; Ch. Glenn & J. De Groof, Findingthe
Right Balance: Freedom, Autonomy and Accountability in Education, 2002; W. Kymlicka, 'The Evolving Basis of European Norms of
Minority Rights: Rights to Culture, Participation and Autonomy', in M. Weller et al. (eds.), The ProtectionofMinoritiesin the Wider Europe,
2008, pp. 11-41.
21 S. Moller Okin, 'Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?', and a 'Reply' in J. Cohen et al. (eds.), Is MulticulturalismBadfor Women?, 1999.
See also Phillipps, supra note 16.
22 L. Green, 'Internal Minorities and their Rights', in J. Baker (ed.) Group Rights, 1994, pp. 101-117; see also A. Eisenberg & J.Spinner-Haley
(eds.), Minorities within Minorities:Equality, Rights and Diversity, 2005.
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individuals in communities, but not a right of the community which can be turned against the
individual. Then, conflicts around religious freedom are not some broader clash, but cases centre
on whether individuals are hurt, and whether every believer has to follow a group's version of
that belief. It is the right of a Muslim girl to learn to swim and dress the way she wants (not
drowning in the water), and not the right of a Muslim community or the parents, as the minicommunity, to decide for her. It is a right which the international community decided to protect,
by way of human rights in education and sex equality. Therefore, it is the nation state with its
public schools which delivers. In other conflicts, a right to religious freedom is a right of women
who marry outside a group not to lose their property or home,23 and it is a right to wear religious
clothing.2 4 It is also a right against genital mutilation, a form of sexual violence which may be
endorsed by a group, but which is not endorsed by fundamental human rights.2 5 In all these
conflicts, groups are often positioned against individuals and groupism is a danger to (as well as
a danger in most concepts of) equality. More broadly, when religion is a short cut to culture, and
vice versa, it constructs a specific type of a collective claim which invites problems of groupism.
Yet this is not the only problematic frame in discussions of religion and human rights.
2.2. Othering sex inequality
The return of religion to the political and legal agenda has been accompanied, and has in some
way invited, another item of public interest. It is also an item with a history and an item which
does not surface unchanged: sex equality, or to use its political name despite all attempts to
discredit or replace it, feminism. Sex equality has been, to be sure, a marginalized concern for
centuries. More precisely, women have largely been absent from concepts of justice, legal
subjectivity, or human rights.26 Then, sex equality became a concern located with women only,
which is not silence but marginalization, and it has been labelled private, thus not political and
of public concern, not part of the common good. These days, sex equality is a recognised human
right, but is watered down by those not interested in change, to sort women into good and bad
ones, the good ones to be considered different, as in difference-feminism which informs a
symmetrical interpretation of equality, and the bad ones to be considered dominant and
imposturous, as in radical feminism which informs a concept of substantive equality. Sex equality
did always come in such varieties, some easily mainstream-compatible, and others
transformative, opting for radical change. What we see on the agenda today is mostly the
mainstream version. So when sex equality and feminism are back, it is mostly a particular brand
of feminism, or equality as a right.
Yet this is not all there is. In addition to the problem of symmetrical equality, there is a
more specific problem when sex equality is on the agenda next to religion. When sex equality
is put on the political mainstream agenda and when the mainstream is concerned with conflicts
around religion, equality is orientalised,sex equality is the other. Otheringis a strategy to locate
a problem elsewhere and to remain categorically clean, untouched; and orientalisingis othering
in a particular mode, establishing the occident as the unlabelled standard and the orient as

23 C. MacKinnon, 'Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo (1983)', in Feminism Unmodified: Discourseson Life and
Law, 1987, pp. 63-69.
24 Such conflicts reach the courts in very different ways. Some arise out of employment settings, others as refugee law or asylum cases;
25

B. Ankenbrand, 'Refugee Women Under German Asylum Law', 2002 InternationalJ. ofRefugee Laiw, pp. 45-56.
See N. Toubia, 'Female Genital Mutilation', in J. Peters & A. Wolpe (eds.) Women 's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist

Perspectives, 1995, pp. 224-237, at 226. In Germany, legislation has been introduced to strengthen criminal law against genital mutilation
in 2009.
26 On concepts of justice, see S. Moller Okin, Justice, Genderandthe Family, 1989; for human rights, see C. MacKinnon, Are Women Human?,
2006.
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different, dark, elsewhere, the problem.27 Political developments in the Netherlands, in Germany,
in the UK or in Switzerland illustrate the point: These multicultural politics, which by now
encompass politics of citizenship in all dimensions,2 8 focus on gendered violence, a topic
formerly reserved for radical feminists, and new to the mainstream political agenda. But, at the
same time, this is a focus on gendered violence in Muslim or other 'immigrant' families only,
a reference which is intended to have gendered violence and other substantive inequalities in
mainstream society fade away. By otheringsex inequality, a majority pretends to finally become
feminist but does so with a watered-down version of feminism, and instead engages in, ultimately, racist politics.
This is a move to protect majorities from challenges to the normalcy of privilege. They are
not unknown. Regarding gendered and sexualized violence, many societies have labelled child
abuse or the rape of married women by their husbands or domestic violence generally as a
problem of the lower classes, effects of little education, bad habits, alcohol and other drugs,
unemployment, poverty. Then, class is used to other inequality. And nowadays, it is often
religion, sometimes coupled with class, which codes similar classifications. 'Those' immigrants,
the mainstream story goes, do not yet know about modernity, have traditional problematic habits,
are often unemployed and generally less economically successful than the rest of 'us'. This is
classism and orientalizing culturalism at work, more specifically islamophobia and racism and
sexism mostly in the form of heteronormativity. This operation marks differences as natural,
collective and homogenous; it produces a stigma relating to sex, sexuality, ethnicity or race and
religion. It focuses on a 'backward' minority 'group' and has mainstream society shine as
enlightened and free from sexist or violent cultures or practices. Then, equality politics is
depicted as outdated, given its achievements in mainstream society, and resources shift to the
other, either as perpetrators or to help the, stereotypes at hand, poor and female victims. In the
Netherlands or Great Britain, attention and resources have shifted from inequalities in mainstream society to inequalities in migrant communities,29 and the German conservative Government now dedicates the 'Islamkonferenz', its most prominent effort to discuss Islam with
Muslims living in Germany, to the topic of 'genderjustice' entirely. This is a return of feminism
to the agenda which comes at a price of watering down the concept and of othering. It is also this
discursive turn to other sex inequality which was a key element in the right-wing campaign to
prohibit minarets in Switzerland by way of referendum.
2.3. Tolerance frame
Otheringpaves the way towards yet another discursive item which is important to consider in the
conflicts in human rights around religion and equality. To illustrate, we may again take a look
at Germany, where Maria Bdhmer, the conservative Federal Government Commissioner for
Integration, stated in her speech on Women's Day in 2008 that 'Tolerance is no one-way street'.so
What does that mean? Tolerance is the very essence not only of German im/migration and
27 F. Coronil, 'Jenseits des Okzidentalismus. Unterwegs zu nichtimperialen geohistorischen Kategorien', in S. Conrad & S. Randeria (eds.),
Jense its des Eurozentrisnus.PostkolonialePerspektiveninden Geschichts- undKulturvissenschaften,2002,pp. 176-219; G. Dietze, 'Critical
Whiteness Theory und Kritischer Okzidentalismus. Zwei Figurationen hegemonialer Selbstreflexion', in: M. Tiberger et al. (eds.), Weif3Weif3sein - Whiteness. Studien zu Rassismus und Geschlecht, 2006, pp. 219-249.
28 See S. Baer, 'Citizenship in Europe and the Construction ofGender by Law in the European Charter ofFundamental Rights', in K. Knop (ed.)
Gender andHuman Rights, 2004, pp. 83-112.

29 Supra note 15.
30 For an analysis, see Sch. Amir-Moazami, 'Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus. A German Case Study', 2005 J. ofContemporary
European Studies, pp. 267-286, and, with sources for Bohmer, 'Islam und Geschlecht unter liberal-sakularer Regierungsftihrung - Die
Deutsche Islam Konferenz', in J. Brunner &, S. Lavi (eds.), Tel Aviver Jahrbuchfur deutsche Geschichte 37, Juden und Muslime in
Deutschland.Recht Religion, Identiit,2009, pp. 185-205.
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culturalist politics and the mainstream approach to multiculturalism. But it is also contested,
since it may imply a graceful act to live with something or someone, thus privilege, or it may call
for recognition. It is this ambivalence in tolerance why many are worried 3' while I am particularly concerned with its regulatory side.
More specifically, nation states have developed elaborate techniques to administer
tolerance as control, or in Foucauldian terms, to discipline by way of regulation. For example,
the state may 'tolerate' individual life decisions but turn social services into a system of 'demand
and support', thus control people rather than just support them. As another example, the state
may grant tax benefits to marriage and in fact support the patriarchal middle and upper-class
heterosexual family because such benefits only pay for those with higher earnings, i.e. in light
of the global gender pay gap, men. The state may also 'tolerate' cultural diversity but pass an
immigration law which requires active support for and belief in features defined as basic to 'us',
like a Christian type of marriage deemed different from marriages convened according to Jewish
or Muslim rules. Finally, the state may 'tolerate' different religions, but privilege only those that
conform to specific notions thereof, as in the German example communities which are organized
like a Christian church. Here, tolerance hides and frames aversion. 'Tolerant' law is not outright
repressive and punishing, as in a general prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf, but it is
'activating', as political pedagogy, which also happens when politicians call for an obligation for
migrant children to visit day-care centres. Law may then be 'caring', enforced liberation by law,
when politicians discuss a prohibition on headscarves for all girls below the age of 14. Such
policies are certainly always also embedded in specific regulatory schemes of state-church
relations. But the tolerance frame gives them a specific twist.
2.4. Law as a fetish
Finally, there is a tendency in discussions of conflicts around religion/cultures and equality to
fetishise law. Then, discussions of conflicts in human rights focus on court decisions which react
to insular claims, again reduced to an abstract narrative of 'key' facts and 'the' law applicable
thereto. There is 'the' case of 'the' headscarf, not even expanding it to a claim of a Muslim
woman to have a right to work, or 'the' case of forced marriage, not even acknowledging the
claim of a woman who wants to be protected from violence, or 'the' case of the bride price,
mostly not even told as a claim of a woman who does not want to be sold, or 'the' case of
divorce, but not even expanded to also see a claim of a woman who wants to define her intimate
life. The court decisions which inform these stories are specific incidents in the world of legal
utterances which respond to a wide variety of social interaction. As such, court decisions are
indeed as complex as regulation, but they are told as stories, and thus become more easily
fetishised as 'the case'. All kinds of actors and academics love these 'cases' and those 'rights',
and that is no coincidence.
Then, it is 'cases' which are discussed, rather than experience, and 'cases' seem to be clear
while experience is personal, ambivalent, shifting, contextual, where details matter. In cases, it
is 'rights' which are invoked, while experience calls for interests, positions, needs, all grounded
in a plurality of legitimate perspectives. And in cases, it is 'the law' which is treated as consistent
rather than as a set of contested norms. Cases are reductions to a seemingly clear statement of a
moral problem, with a tendency to ignore both the complexities on the side of the facts and on

31 Deveaux criticises solutions to conflicts in human rights which emphasize tolerance as ignorant of inequalities within groups; see Deveaux,
supra note 16, Chapter 2 (discusses Ch. Kukathas and J. Spinner-Halev). See also W. Brown, RegulatingAversion: Tolerance in the Age
ofldentity and Empire, 2008.
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the side of the law in question. On the side of the facts, it is important to understand which
conflicts become legal cases, different from political controversy or moral debate, and it is
important to understand what exactly happens to a conflict when it is turned into a case. Otherwise, many aspects are lost in translation. So although cases look like a little story one can tell,
the facts of a case are already the filtered version which lawyers and judges construct from a
communication about experience, which is shaped by additional rules of evidence and procedure,
by presuppositions, by taboo, by silencing and a hierarchy of voices and meaning.32 In addition,
the larger context, i.e. varieties of secularism or intersecting patterns of inequality or minorities
within minorities can easily be forgotten when it is so very fascinating to really discuss a case.
On the side of the law, conflicts in human or fundamental constitutional rights are always
also sites of struggle, not just a statement of conflicting principles or rights. Even cases are not
the easy way to understand conflicts in human rights, despite the fact that legal language lives
by the illusion of encyclopedic clarity.33 The law is in fact somewhat(!) indeterminate, 4 or more
precisely: laws open a semantic space which is constantly filled, again and again, with specific
rhetoric, anchored in politics and moral belief, and organized as doctrine. Any given law and any
given set of rights, including human rights, are contested and, if taken seriously as sites of diverse
interpretation, are not very useful to mark clear collisions, i.e. of religious freedom and equality.
In particular, we have to acknowledge the multi-level legal environments we live in today. Law
appears in many forms and variations in several regulatory regimes. A 'case' which is subject to
a court decision is not the same as the 'case' of the minaret prohibition in the Swiss constitutional
amendment referendum. In fact, instances of regulation are rarely used to illustrate a moral
conflict 'in human rights', and if so, they are also reduced to a 'case', i.e. of the Swiss minaret
prohibition, as if it were an adversarial conflict between two parties, which ignores the multitude
of facets of what happened, and what people make of it. To understand conflicts in human rights,
we however need to understand the specific political, regulatory, or judicial procedures, the
politics therein, the regulatory schemes around it, the actors involved, the discourses and the
governance arrangements.
So although it seems tempting to refer to 'a case' when it comes to very complicated issues,
to look at 'a right' as if it had clear meaning and as if it would be guaranteed on one level, as if
there were no competing claims of interpretation and on different levels of regulation, that does
not do justice to the conflict nor to the law.
3. Cases? Court decisions on headscarves and swimming lessons
Law is a site of struggle and since the rise of democratic constitutionalism, most struggles
eventually make it into the law. 35 Therefore, I will now turn to court decisions as instances of
such struggles, but I will add some complicating ingredient to resist the temptation to tell a story
as if things were clear.

32 S. Baer, 'Thematisierungen. Korper, Sprache und Bild imProze8', inK. Scherpe & Th. Weitin (eds.), Eskalationen. Die Geiwaltvon Kultur,
Recht und Politik, 2003, pp. 109-117.
33 M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses ofPolitics, 1976.
34 This claim is associated with Critical Legal Studies, a version of legal realism in the US, prominently articulated by R. Unger, see with
references M. Tushnet, 'Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States', 2005 J. ofPoliticalPhilosophy, pp. 99-112.
However, there are more or less radical versions of the claim (law as ultimately indeterminate vs. law as open to certain varieties of
interpretation). In German legal science, the problem of legality and meaning applied to cases is treated as a question of method (in fact:
methodology of hermeneutics), and critically so by J. Esser, Vorverstandnis und Methodenwahl, 1970.
35 Before that, nature or some higher power were alternative sites, but in many environments, since the mid 19t' century, regulation and thus
people-made (then: man-made) law privileges law.
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In the 2 1st century, there is a large sample of cases decided by courts on religion and
equality to choose from. Some surface when religious collectives seek public visibility and
collide with what is considered normal in a given setting. Examples include conflicts around
claims to a right to build a mosque and the call to prayer,36 decisions on the right of butchers to
slaughter according to Jewish or Muslim rules, which contravene German, Christianity-compatible food regulations.37 Furthermore, there are several conflicts in settings of public formal
education.38 Mostly, 'cases' about religion in schools have been discussed as such, but should
also be understood as issues of sex segregation.39 For example, a prohibition on wearing a
headscarf for teachers does in fact exclude women, and not men, from specific spheres of
employment, and it illustrates the othering of sex equality when seemingly feminist arguments
are used to justify a measure against Islam. In the German Federal Constitutional Court decision,
there is a strong (in this case: dissenting) opinion by known conservative hard-liners who argue
that sex equality legitimizes a headscarf prohibition.4 0 This also illustrates the problems of
groupism, when the same argument is made by 'leaders' ofthe women's movement and 'representatives' of Muslim women:4 1 since the headscarf is the symbol of sex inequality, and the oppression of women, it should be kept out of schools. Often, the story told about 'the case' ends here.
But note that the German Federal Administrative Court has held that a woman may wear a
headscarf during her legal internship training, since it is part of the required education.42 Also
note that German labour courts are ambivalent concerning the issue, and create space for
headscarves in private employment, but that some lower courts have stated that there may be
little tolerance for headscarves if an employer, or customers, do not appreciate them.43 Regulating
this, states have also endorsed a variety of schemes, with some more explicitly religious Southern
German states targeting Islam, rather than all religions, and an explicitly secular state like Berlin
prohibiting any type of religious dress in all public professions, including child-care facilities,
in a 'Neutrality Law', which, however, has de facto prohibitive effects on women with headscarves in private employment, too. In light of all of the above, rather than based on a limited

36 Decisions were based on construction and planning regulations, which treat all religious buildings the same, and limit the noise levels of bells
and muezzin calls alike but allow for interpretation regarding a requirement of 'fitting into the neighbourhood' ('Einftigen'). Conflicts are
mostly solved outside the courts, where additional concerns are legitimate. See J.-B. Oebbecke, 'Moscheebaukonflikte und der Beitrag des
Rechts', in R. Robert & N. Konegen (eds.): GlobalisierungundLokalisierung.ZurNeubestimmung des Konnunalen in Deutschland,2006,
pp. 273 -283.
37 The leading decision is Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, FCC) 2002, Az: I BvR 1783/99, BVerfGE 104,337 (Muslim
butcher).
38 Such conflicts are particularly interesting because schools are a site of controversies surrounding secular aspects, since schools breed citizens.
This is why the German FCC decision, which prohibited Bavaria, a predominantly Catholic federal German state, from having Christian
crosses put up in public school rooms (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1995, Az. I BvR 1087/91, BVerfGE 93, 1 (crucifix)), may have been the
first case in which politicians called for resistance against the Court, otherwise an institution of the highest esteem and always respected. To
decide that there is a right for children not to study under the Christian cross simply went, for many, too far. Bavaria in fact transposed the
FCC decision into a state law which allows individual children to protest against a cross on the wall, thus placing the burden of dissent on
the minority. And it is the pivotal role of public schools to ensure the majoritarian tradition which also led many to see the analogous
Strasbourg judgment on Italian public schools with a cross (ECtHR 2009, Lautsi v. Italy, application no. 30814/06) as an aberration which
is detrimental to respect for the court. For data from the UK, but also as an example of an intersectional analysis, see Y. Li et al., Equality
GroupInequalitiesInEducation, Employment andEarnings:A research reviewv andanalysisoftrends over time, Equality and Human Rights
Commission 2008.
39 To date, there is no documented German court decision on medical facilities and no decision on religious sex segregation pertaining to
religions other than Islam.
40 Di Fabio et al., dissenting, FCC 2003, Az. 2 BvR 1436/02, BVerfGE 108, 282.
41 In Germany, the most prominent feminist is Alice Schwarzer, the most prominent anti-Islamic Muslim is Necla Kelek. For a critical analysis
of additional dimensions see G. Klauda, Die Vertreibung aus dem Serail,2008.
42 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) 2008, Az: 2 C 22.07, BVerwGE 131, 242.
43 The leading decision does protect women who wear a headscarf, see Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court) 2002, Az: 2 AZR 472/01.
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account of 'the case', the headscarf controversies illuminate the different arguments used, the
frames invoked, the concepts of human rights applied.4 4
The headscarf 'case' has been a hot topic for several years by now. However, there are less
often told, but equally inspiring decisions which one may want to look at to address conflicts in
human rights. One such 'case' is the swimming lesson case. In Germany, this is in fact a line of
court decisions dating back to the early 1990s. There, the courts have dealt with claims brought
by parents, all Muslims, to exclude their children, mostly girls,4 5 but more recently, also boys, 6
from swimming lessons, physical education classes in general, or school trips with overnight
stays at public schools. The conflict is, in some ways, whether there should be sex segregation
in education. Initially, the German courts were mostly willing to accommodate this and, in fact,
the parents.4 7 However, over time and similar to the Swiss High Court,4 8 the German courts
started to defend the principle of co-education and less easily to allow parents to opt out, thus
excluding girls from swimming, sports, or field trips.4 9 This shift also informs a 2009 decision
by the Federal Constitutional Court against Baptist parents who wanted their children to be
removed from a school project involving a theatre play to educate children about and prevent
them from becoming victims of sexual abuse.o Then, a lower German court held that a girl
whose parents had signed an agreement to have her participate in sports lessons, with what the
school and many Muslims consider to be adequate dress (the trade name is 'burkini' which is a
headscarf, tunic and trouser outfit designed for swimming), is bound by that agreement, and
cannot opt out of the general curriculum." The shift does not only indicate a change of views on
sex segregation or integration, but it also indicates a change of views on religion and public
secular space.
The cases are, however, not just interesting decisions on conflicts. They always illustrate
procedures and instances of a debate on the meaning of equality and of religious belief, of
secularism and of law. To use another example, meanings also shift in contexts which do not
immediately invoke sex equality claims, but do in fact imply them, too. In 2009, a Berlin
administrative court decided that a public school has to offer space to pray to accommodate a
Muslim male student.5 2 The public - i.e. newspapers and politicians - were outraged - too much
accommodation!, the loss of our identity!, 'them' taking 'it' too far! - and the State Government

44 For a more nuanced analysis ofthe conflicts, see T. Loenen, 'The HeadscarfDebate: Approaching the Intersection ofSex, Religion, and Race
under the ECHR and EC Equality Law', in D. Schiek & V. Chege (eds.), European Union DiscriminationLaw: Comparative Perspectives
on MultidimensionalEqualiyLaiw, 2008; S. Berghahn & P. Rostock (eds.), Der Stoff aus dem Konflikte sind,2009; S. Baer & M. Wrase,
'Zwischen Integration und "westlicher" Emanzipation: Verfassungsrechtliche Perspektiven zum Kopftuch(-verbot) und der Gleichberechtigung', 2006 Kritische Vierteliahresschriftfur Gesetzgebung und Rechtsiwissenschaft, pp. 401-416.
45 The German leading decision is Bundesverwaltungsgericht 1993, Az: 6 C 8.91, BVerwGE 94, 82 (school needs to accommodate claims of
parents not to have daughter exposed during swimming classes). Later cases by the lower courts are Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative
Court) Hamburg, April 2005 (rejected claim of Pakistani parents to have their 9-year old daughter removed from swimming lessons).
46 Verwaltungsgericht Dfisseldorf, Az: 18 K 74/05, May 2009 (parents argued that 11-year old son should not be exposed to girls in an
immodest state of dress).
47 Amtsgericht (Local Court) Tiergarten 1986, Az: 286 OWi 17/86; Bundesverwaltungsgericht 1993, Az: 6 C 8/91, BVerwGE 94, 82-94,
reversing Oberverwaltungsgericht (Superior Administrative Court) North-Rhine Westphalia 1991, Az: 19 A 2198/91.
48 The Swiss Highest Court overturned an earlier decision from 1993 (BGE 119 Ia 178) and ordered two boys to attend swimming lessons, based
on a reasoning which largely focuses on immigration and the need for integration. See Bundesgericht 2 C 149/2008, BGE 135 1 79
(24 October 2008).
49 Verwaltungsgericht Hamburg 2005, Az: 11 E 1044/05; Verwaltungsgericht Disseldorf 2005, Az: 18 K 74/05 (Muslim boy), 2008,
Az: 18 K 301/08; OberverwaltungsgerichtNorth-Rhine Westphalia 2009, Az: 19 B 1362/08, 19 E 1161/08, affirming Verwaltungsgericht
Gelsenkirchen 2008, Az: 4 L 526/08; 2009, Az: 18 L 695/09; id. 2009, Az: 19 B 801/09, affirming Verwaltungsgericht Dtisseldorf 2009,
Az: 18 L 695/09.
50 Bundesverfassungsgericht Az: 1 BvR 1358/09, 21 July 2009. Also, a Hamburg Administrative Court rejected a claim by a Turkish mother
to withdraw her daughters, age 14 and 15, from sex education in biology classes, Verwaltungsgericht Hamburg 2004, Az: 15 VG 5827/2003.
51 Verwaltungsgericht Disseldorf 2009, Az: 18 L 695/09; affirmed on appeal: Oberverwaltungsgericht North-Rhine Westphalia 2009,
Az: 19 B s801/09.
52 Verwaltungsgericht Berlin 2009, Az: VG 3 A 984.07.
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has not challenged the decision on appeal. However, as in all other debates in the area, there are
also voices across the political spectrum which endorse the decision as long as children do not
miss classes, which ask questions about sex segregation during prayer and whether schools
should accommodate that, about Muslim prayer requirements and modifications thereto, etc. So
what is the case all about? The dominant story is the clash of cultures and the defence of a
particular type of school, the privatization of belief and neutrality in education pitted against
space for Muslim rituals, and for some, space for a Christian way of life. Just like the headscarf
case or the swimming lessens, there are thus larger issues which inform such conflicts. Beyond
the critique which should be attentive to groupism, othering equality or law as a fetish, I will now
turn to reconsider secularism and the human rights at issue, to pave the way not only for critique
but also for solutions.
3.1. Secularism - an institutionalized ideology

Context matters when we seek to understand court decisions in the field of religion and equality,
as conflicts in human rights. Regarding legal reactions to such conflicts, it is the context of the
regulation of the religious, usually abbreviated as church-state relations,53 which is particularly
relevant here. For many, secularism, in its regulated varieties, is at stake, when confronted with
claims to sex-segregation on religious grounds in educational settings or employment and
politics.
Most legal systems endorse one version of secularism or another, be it nation states or
transnational and international legal systems. For some, constitutionalism, the adherence to a rule
of law, is a secular concept as such, in that its core ingredient is the superiority of people-made
norms, in deliberative processes of democracy.54 Then, states which establish, in their constitutions, religious law as being superior, like Muslim states ranging from Egypt to Iran, or a Jewish
state like Israel, or the Catholic state of the Vatican, may not count as varieties of
constitutionalism at all. For others, constitutionalism is a more flexible concept which can
accommodate strong religious norms, and thus allow, i.e., for 'Islamic constitutionalism', or
which can accommodate other specificities and thus allow, i.e., for 'African constitutionalism'."
But what is the meaning of secular in such debates?
There is, as sociologists of religion tell us, not one secularism but many variations thereof.5 6
In particular, regulatory regimes do differ, as the comparative study of the headscarf controversy
in the European research project VEIL has pointed out." Some states like France or Turkey

53 Note that the relevant clause in US constitutional law ('The separation of church and state') was codified in the First Amendment to protect
religious sects from the state and the Church establishment and to protect the federal secular state from religion.
54 Classic: L. Henkin et al., Human Rights, 2009; for a different view see Casanova2008, supranote 7, p. 16, (regarding the varieties of churchstate relations in Europe, 'one can therefore safely conclude that the strict secular separation of church and state is neither a sufficient nor
a necessary condition for democracy.'). For a critique ofconstitutionalism as an ideology, see D. Lev, 'Social Movements, Constitutionalism,
and Human Rights: Comments from the Malaysian and Indonesian Experience', in D. Greenberg et al. (eds.), Constitutionalism and
Democracy: Transitionsin the Contemporary World, 1993, pp. 139-141, and others. Often, law is treated as monolithic, with no due regard
to the varieties of regulation and enforcement mechanisms as well as effects. In some discussions, law is referred to as human rights when
it is in fact individual constitutional rights, more or less informed by interpretations of international law, which govern the case. In other
instances, law is referred to as principles, when it is in fact rights in a very specific interpretation which governs a conflict, etc. It is my
impression that our understanding of the issues is in a rather desperate need to be better informed, legally speaking.
55 A. An-Na'im, African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam, 2006. It is important to differentiate between a descriptive use of African,
pertaining to a region, and a normative use, which invokes some sort of 'African' values, thus a culturalized and groupist (on groupism, see
above) narrative, similar to 'Western', 'European', 'American' etc.
56 However, secularism is a contested concept also in sociology. For an overview, see P. Gorski & A. Altinordu, 'After Secularization?',
2008 Annual Review ofSociology, pp. 55-85.
57 Materials and research results at <http://www.univie.ac.at/veil/Home3/index.htm>, in particular S. Berghahn, 'Judicial expertise on current
regulations as well as on explanations for varieties in regulations and in the framing of European headscarf debates', 2008, download at
<http://www.univie.ac.at/veil/Home3/download.php?ealclba9eldd6ceb773fbd 15 1c2a2b3>.
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regulate state abstinence from religion (and Joan Scott has made the point that this is not totally
'French'), others like the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland or Germany are religion-friendly
(often called 'neutral'), and still others like Great Britain, Denmark or Greece endorse state
churches.5 9 Comparative studies in constitutionalism also show that the doctrinal answers to
conflicts around religious freedom differ less on the level of law and more on the level of whether
and what kind of socio-cultural aspects are employed in a legal decision.60 In Germany, one may
very well observe how religious belief becomes part of the script of officially secular legal
systems, a hidden agenda of religious freedom as long as Christian churches were the only ones
to profit from it, moving to the forefront at the very moment at which other religions claimed
equal standing.61 German law illustrates the tensions: Muslim communities gain the right to build
mosques, and have a Muezzin call on the terms set for church bells, but states also lost the right
to hang a Christian cross in public school rooms, or in the courts. There are nuns teaching in
public schools, but there shall be no women with headscarves in the same facility in some
Lander, while others prohibit any religious sign in public educational settings. Religions enjoy
tremendous freedom to discriminate against all they define not to belong, and women are thus
excluded from several positions in Catholic churches as well as Jewish communities. Now that
Muslims claim such rights, conservatives call for equality, to not extend the privileges (to
discriminate!) that they enjoy. And, as mentioned, the headscarf controversy has motivated some
Lander to explicitly privilege Christianity, yet keeping the taboo of the yarmulke (which would
have certainly shattered the Christian privilege in Germany), and never touching upon a Sikh
turban, which seems not to appear in Germany on a relevant stage.
Regarding law, there is thus a powerful argument that secularism is, at its core, a commitment to deliberation, and not to metaphysics.62 Saj6 recently concluded that most states have not
consistently followed that commitment, to date, but that they employ a 'fuzzy' and 'half-hearted'
version of secularism.6 3 Also consider that different conflicts appear on different stages, so that
the issues discussed, and the solutions proposed, vary considerably, are case-driven and inconsistent. And consider that conflicts around religion often expose the unsolved conflicts around sex
equality. Overall, simple invocations of 'secularism' must be called ideological since they
actually hide the fact that existing regulatory schemes in fact privilege some and disadvantage
others. It is the controversies around religious rights to sex segregation or marriage and family
matters which bring that to the fore. There, religious minorities claim rights which religious
majorities enjoy, and there, religious minorities also confront religious majorities with the sex
equality issues they fail to address. Thus, secularism is not only at stake, but it is challenged in
a very specific way.
3.2. Equality and religion - a refined understanding of individual rights
The challenge to secularism is specific because religion and equality are on the political agenda.
As mentioned, religious freedom often appears in the guise of culture, and then becomes a
58 J. Scott, The Politics of the Veil, 2007.
59 A striking fact: Germany is the only religion-friendly state which reacts with a harsh prohibition on the headscarf, similar to Turkey and
France. See Berghahn & Rostock 2009, supranote 44, pp. 11 et seq.
60 N. Dorsen et al., Comparative Constitutionalism,2003, Chapter 7.
61 A critical and comprehensive study ofthe law ofchurch-state relations is C. Classen, Religionsrecht, 2007; M. Heckel, 'ZurZukunftsfhbigkeit
des deutschen "Staatskirchenrechts" oder "Religionsverfassungsrechts"', 2009 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts, pp. 309-390.
62 Saj6, supranote 9.
63 One could define the secular neutral state as one which offers equal access, equal distance, equal respect or equal support to all the religions
within its territory- all ofwhich is not a reality in Europe, or elsewhere. For further discussions, see M. Galenkamp, 'Towards a Socialization
ofFundamental Rights', in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts Between FundamentalRights, 2008, pp. 149-165; 0. Roy, Secularism ConfrontsIslam,
2007.
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collective interest of a group, invoking the danger of groupism even when a claim is brought by
an individual. Equality often appears as a principle of symmetrically equivalent treatment, and
of a concern for groups, too, which are treated poorly by others, to immunize oneself from
criticism. Thus, in the headscarf, swimming and prayer-room controversies, we need to pay
attention to interpretive detail to better understand which version of which human right is exactly
invoked.
If parents want their daughters to be removed from physical education, like swimming
lessons, they do claim an individual right to religious freedom but refer to a collective religious
norm, i.e. of modest dress for females, thus a sexualized and gendered code of behaviour which
is meant to control men and protect women against sexual advances. School administrators, state
governments and more and more judges do insist, countering that claim, on sex equality,
interpreted as a call to treat likes alike, thus all pupils the same. But clearly, that is not convincing. Such a symmetrical similaritys doctrine of equality invites claims of difference.6 4 And this
is a tempting invitation, since it is in tune with deeply-held everyday convictions, as 'knowledge'
on 'the' difference between 'the' sexes, which is exactly one aspect of religious belief which
renders the multicultural conflicts around education, clothing and the like so problematic. If one
can thus argue that pupils are indeed not alike, in relation to physical education, one has a claim
to differ. The more parents can argue convincingly that their daughters differ from Christian or
atheist girls, and from all boys, the more they have to be accommodated in that difference, thus:
they eventually do not learn to swim. If we follow this strong tradition of symmetrical equality,
we need to eventually accommodate, thus to allow inequality, but in fact perpetuate disadvantage
and exclusion. Then, equality serves as the principle (and sometimes, the individual right) of
equal treatment regardless of hierarchy and discrimination, and accepts the differences which are
made because of sex, of race, of religion, of disabilities, etc. So if there is really a difference, the
story goes, there is a dilemma, since equality presupposes the difference it is called to undo, and
a dilemma is a conflict which cannot be resolved.6 5 And even if we acknowledge the disadvantage, as a substantive inequality, but reduce it to but one group's problem, we endorse categorisation and overlook the intersectionality of inequalities. And then, if we allow another group (a
religion) to solve that problem (whether children should learn to swim, when to pray, what to
wear) we silence dissent within the group and perpetuate elitism. So there must be another way.
In the prayer-room case, the situation is in many ways different, but the problems are
similar. The German court argued that a Muslim boy who considers prayer during school-time
to be part of his individual religious needs to be accommodated if possible, thus given room to
pray. So who defines when that boy needs to pray: the boy, or his parents, or the religious
community, in fact then: its leaders with whom he or she is associated? Also, assume that the
school, different from the administration which went on appeal, follows suit and makes a room
available for Muslim prayer. Will girls be allowed to enter that room? Should the room feature
a wall to separate boys and girls, or in some way force them on the same floor? What about
people who do not want to be classified as male or female? It is no coincidence that this aspect
of the case has not yet made it to the agenda of fundamental rights issues. But it suggests that
64 In Germany, the General Equality Statute AGG prohibits disadvantages based on structural inequalities, but then oscillates between a formal
and a substantive understanding of equality, an essentialist and a constructivist understanding of gender, race, or religion, and offers ways
out of an equality regime, in particular, for religious communities.
65 In Germany, there is a known problem to list race here, which is replaced with ethnicity, while sex/gender are easily established as a
difference. D. Cornell, BeyondAccomodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstructionandthe Law, 1991, elaborated on the dilemma in feminist
terms, while M. Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law, 1990, p. 20, has framed it as a more general

problem. Very clearly in U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), Menschenrechte haben (k)ein Geschlecht, 1990. The core idea has most clearly been
articulated by C. MacKinnon, 'Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law', 1991 Yale L. J., pp. 1281-1328.
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there may be no conflict around religion and human rights which does not invoke additional
inequalities, like gender, at least when we deal with religions that endorse heavily gendered
norms of behaviour. Then, every human rights discussion around religion must also be a human
rights discussion around sex equality, and not just a subtle move to mark the problem as the
other. To take that further, I propose to think of conflicts in human rights in a way that always
already relates fundamental rights to each other, which allows us to see where they conflict, but
be prepared to address that. Yet what does that mean?
There are good reasons, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, to ground human rights analysis
in a fundamental rights triangle of liberty, equality, and dignity.6 6 This is not just some call to
some human right, but a very specific call to specific concepts of equality and liberty, in this
case: religious freedom. And the conflicts around religious freedom and equality are particularly
illuminating to consider how we should refine our understanding of human rights.
Regarding equality, the alternative version of that human right which could be applied in
both cases is substantive equality, well known to those working in feminist legal theory, antiracist legal theory67 and, more generally, law against substantive discrimination. Here, equality
is interpreted as an asymmetrical claim against hierarchisation,a claim against substantive,
socially entrenched disadvantage.68 Equality, thus reconstructed, is a right against discrimination
not as a difference, but as oppression and dominance, disadvantage and exclusion embedded in
a pattern which turns one aspect of a person into a group marker. Difference, here, is either an
infinite fact of life, i.e. a multitude of differences, or, as a or the difference, it is the problem, the
ideological construct which serves to legitimate discrimination, mark and effectuate disadvantage. In the case of sex, the difference is heteronormative biologism, which privileges a specific
masculinity and adequate femininity alongside it. It is an ingredient of most religions, but also
of most other configurations of 'culture', and something human rights have addressed as a
problem since CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women) at least. In the case of religion, the difference is a culturalist essentialism, which
privileges limited readings of canonical texts, and a limited understanding of the physics and
metaphysics of a belief, to the detriment of non-mainstream believers and the rich diversity in
religious communities.
Ifwe start from there, from human rights directed against categorizing people in groups and
privileging some while disadvantaging others, conflicts around religion and equality appear in
a different light. The most radical development is the turn from a collective claim to individual
rights grounded in collective contexts. If equality informs liberty, individual freedom is a right
of people within communities. This, I suggest, is an individualistic concept of human rights
without group rights, but with minority protection. It positions equality as an individual right
against boxing identities, against a reduction of people to biological or elitist defined categories,
against enforced groupism. It relies on meaningful, relational self-determination and ensures
dignity, as a third corner of the triangle, as mutual respect. Then, individual needs to pray in
schools or wherever may be accommodated just like individual clothing needs. But prayer or
clothing which violates a principle of mutual respect is not an emanation of this individual right.
Therefore, it is at least a tenable argument to prohibit a face-covering veil because it seriously

66 S. Baer, 'Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism', 2009 U. of Toronto L. J., pp. 417-468.
67 Mostly, this is labelled critical race theory, just as in gender studies, which are in fact critical sex studies, because gender has been developed
as a concept to challenge notions of sex. I prefer to label both with terms taken from political struggles to end the problem they address, thus
feminism and anti-racism.
68 The more this version of equality gains recognition, the less one finds references to path-breaking work, often hiding the feminist genealogy,
or simply stealing ideas.
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inhibits communication, yet it is a violation of fundamental human rights to prohibit a headscarf,
a turban or a yarmulke since there is no violation of additional concern. Therefore, children
should be allowed to wear any bathing suit they like for swimming lessons as long as they can
move safely and talk face to face, but they should learn how to swim. In the Swiss High Court
case, the parents promised to send their child to private swimming lessons. But if we remember
the arguments which convinced the US Supreme Court to end formal racist school segregation,
in Brown v. BoardofEducation in 195469, then educational segregation does violate, as a default
starting point, individual rights to equality and dignity, since it is not based on equal concern and
recognition. This is also why a prayer room is fine, but why enforced sex segregation in prayer
must not be endorsed by a state. So there are then, I suggest, ways to address the conflicts which
trouble us around religion and equality in more nuanced ways.
3.3. Multi-level regulation - against the return of the public-private ideology

Finally, conflicts around religion and equality feature additional characteristics which make them
rather complicated, specifically when they are discussed as problems of human rights, but
increasingly so in national legislation as well. It is the problem of multi-level regulation and the
problem of the public-private distinction, the latter which is well known as a pitfall regarding
human rights yet back in rather problematic ways. Currently, there is a trend to treat the local,
the cultural and the religious as the private and the global, the national and the secular as the
public, and this creates unequal standards, in violation of the very rights we seek to protect.
Today, the concept of multi-level regulation is often used to explain the interplay between
the EU and nation states.7 0 However, it can very well be expanded and employed as a general
approach to conflicts in human rights." Then, multi-level regulation names the phenomenon of
a diverse set of rules which are applicable to any case. One set of rules is legal in the sense of
being institutionally bound to a public democratic process and institutionalized enforcement, and
that set consists of rules on various levels, such as international, transnational, national, and local
rules, with the local consisting of state law, municipal law, and laws of organizations. Another
set of rules, known from studies in legal pluralism,7 2 is social, and consists of traditional,
religious and moral rules, which are often specific to communities or activities, like the rules of
a game of sports, or, say, the rules of flirtation or 'dates' of heterosexuals somewhere, or the rules
of a Protestant community, maybe different from the rules of a national Protestant church. Multilevel regulation, so defined, thus consists of varieties of rules, subject to regulatory choice, some
of which are procedural and some substantive, some of which do state rights, some principles,
and some come with and some without sanctions. With this in mind, law resists being fetishised.
Rather, law looks like an onion, and, to stay with the metaphor, the more competently one peels
it the less one may cry. But why would one have to cry?
As mentioned above, if discussions of conflicts in human rights are reduced to a case or to
a clash between two rights, if not cultures, one simply misses the richness of legally-based
arguments which are available. In addition, one risks losing the case in another court system or
in a controversy brought in a different framework. Therefore, it is rather productive to think along
69 United States Supreme Court, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70 An example is A Follesdal et al. (eds.), Multilevel Regulation andthe EU. The Interplay between Global,European and NationalNormative
Processes,2008
71 One may think of regulatory choice, meta regulation etc., which may be part of the underdeveloped understanding of law in discussions
dominated by economics and some sociology and political science. Inspiring approaches can be found in work on norm diffusion, attentive
to governance structures and knowledge politics.
72 Meaning the newer concept, as discussed by S. Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism', 1988 Law & Society Review, pp. 869-896. However, legal
pluralism tends to stay within legal ethnology, and comparative legal studies. Therefore, multi-rule governance.
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multi-level lines, even in tiny local cases. Swimming lessons in public schools are not just
conflicts between two fundamental rights, but are governed by safety as well as insurance
regulations, by administrative rules as well as laws governing curricula, by parental rights as well
as children's rights, by labour law for teachers as well as rules of pedagogy, and more. Similarly,
a prayer room is governed by human rights, but also by building or safety regulations, insurance
rules and employment law. So every time there is already a local onion which needs to be
carefully peeled.
In addition, the German swimming lesson case has, for example, been decided based on
state school law and the national constitution. Had it gone up to the human rights system guarded
by the European Court of Human Rights, regional human rights would have been added. Had
it gone up in the EU system, we would have seen the need to consider the now binding European
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which covers education in Article 14, which the EU Directives
against discrimination based on Article 13 EC and the national and local laws which transpose
them do to a certain extent as well. But under the heading of human rights and committed to
finding global standards particularly in conflicts which result in part from global migration, one
needs to go even further, indeed to global human rights. Specifically, the United Nations
addressed education in the Convention against Discrimination in Education in 196074 and
education is subject to the Social and Cultural Rights Convention (ICESRC, Article 13) as well
as being a matter for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, Articles 28 and 29)" and
the Convention for Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD, Article 24). Article 10 of the
Convention on sex equality (CEDAW) addresses sex discrimination in education and Article 7
of the Convention against racism (CERD) targets racism there, too. With all of this at hand, a
competent analysis of such conflicts, considering multi-level regulation, would be enriched by
a larger pool of arguments.
Large is certainly not simply or necessarily better. But the multiple levels of and the
varieties in regulation which ensure human rights would allow us to reveal the inconsistencies
of 'law', of claims of 'secularism', of 'the right to religious freedom' or 'the right to equality'.
Then, one may wonder whether it is particularly the law, or the multitude of regulations, in the
area of religion and equality that does not allow for consistent answers, neither on one level nor
across levels of law. Is it because they invoke deep moral concerns, deeper than others? Or does
the inconsistency result from the entrenchment of inequality in the very fabric of our legal
systems? 76 There are very strong arguments that sex inequality is indeed a building block of
liberal democracies,n7 which would explain why such democracies have trouble in addressing the
conflicts at hand. Or are the conflicts we discuss here just another instance of contested post-

73 E.g., on the headscarf, ECtHR2001,Dahlab v. Switzerland, application no. 42393/98; 2005, LeylaSahinv. Turkey, application no. 44774/98.
74 Online at <http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/pdf/DISCRI E.PDF>. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
covers education in Art. 26.
75 Art. 29 states that education shall pursue 'b. the development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles
enshrined in the Charter ofthe United Nations', but also 'c. the development ofrespect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity,
language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and
for civilisations different from his or her own', which may collide with 'd. the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society,
in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and
persons of indigenous origin'.
76 In family law, some observe a pragmatist chaos, which may have the same cause.
77 In European political studies, namely B. Sauer, Die Asche des Souverans. Staat und Demokratie in der Geschlechterdebatte,2001 and
E. Kreisky, 'Der Staat als "Minnerbund": Der Versuch einer feministischen Staatssicht', in E. Biester et al. (eds.), Staat ausfeninistischer
Sicht, 1992, pp. 53-62. In Anglo-American contexts, Moller Okin, supranote 26; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 1988.
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national law?" We will only come to understand that if we allow multi-level regulation to be
considered in our analysis.
This task is a difficult one. Mostly, lawyers are neither educated in all relevant fields of the
law nor on all levels of the law, nor are courts trained or have jurisdiction to adjudicate them all
together. This is one of the effects of what has been seen as differentiation and modernity, but
is also a problem of national legacies and intradisciplinary compartmentalization. The architecture of law itself implicitly states what is relevant in the world, and what is not. It effectuates
specific assumptions, attributes meaning, constructs lives, and these may already conflict, be
inconsistent." If swimming is part of a school curriculum because surviving in the water is
considered to be a basic necessity, it may very well collide with insurance policies, or, in our
case, with religious clothing rules, with gendered clothing rules, etc. What matters? If a school
is regulated as a space with little caveats for religious instruction, then rooms for prayer during
breaks collide with the principle of secularism, with building regulations, with safety regulations
etc. Which matter most? We may need additional guidance in how to deal with conflicting norms,
and we may need refined analytical concepts to interpret them. It may help to refer to a basic
triangle of fundamental rights. It may in fact inspire what has been operationalised in appeals to
the 'Einheit der Rechtsordnung', the doctrine of the unity of the legal order. But if that shall not
be a myth, an ideology, we need tools to build it.
If we understand multi-level regulation, we may also be better equipped to handle the other
challenge which comes with the existence of multiple rules, the challenge of the public-private
distinction in international law. It occurs when problems are delegated from the top to the bottom,
from the grand to the small. This is not just subsidiarity at work. Rather, such delegation is
particularly well known and has been thoroughly criticised in international law, because it
disregards, specifically, sex inequality." For example, in EU law and all transposition rules in
EU member states sex discrimination is allowed for religious entities if this is part of what they
believe in." Therefore, a claim to sex segregation in a public facility by a religious entity or by
believers is confronted with the fact that religion counts, but sex equality does, too. EU law and
member states that transposed it have given way to religious bodies when it comes to the
discrimination of, in particular, sexuality, albeit not racism.82 Thus, much of the current law does
'solve' the conflict in human rights by establishing a church privilege to allow for discrimination,

78 For a larger claim of transnational sites as arenas of contestation, see A. Wiener, The Invisible ConstitutionofPolitics: ContestedNormsand
InternationalEncounters,2008.
79 The feminist legal theorist T. Stang Dahl once analyzed this as a male construction of the world; see her Women's Law, 1987.
80 Seminal works include F. Olsen, 'The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform', 1983 HarvardLaw Review,
pp. 1497-1578; Moller Okin, supranote 26; B. Rossler, Der Wert des Privaten,2001; C. Chinkin et al., 'Feminist approaches to international
law: reflections from another century', in D. Buss & A. Manji (eds.), Internationallaw: modernfeminist approaches,2005, pp. 17-47
(discussing their seminal critique from 1991).
81 Art. 4 of Directive 2000/78/EC (see note 82, infra). Regarding intersectional discrimination, see generally European Commission
(Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Unit G4), Tackling Multiple Discrimination.Practices,
policies and laiws, 2007.
82 Directive 2000/43/EC (the 'Race Directive') does not exempt religious bodies from the prohibition of discrimination, while Directive
2000/78/EC ('Framework Directive') does so in Art. 4 on occupational requirements, which says that '2. Member States may maintain
national legislation in force at the date of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national practices existing
at the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public or private
organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based on a person's religion or belief shall not
constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person's religion
or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation's ethos. This difference
oftreatment shall be implemented taking account of Member States' constitutional provisions and principles, as well as the general principles
of Community law, and should notjustify discrimination on another ground. Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this
Directive shall thus not prejudice the right of churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion or
belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty
to the organisation's ethos.'
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in which some courts followed suit in the early swimming lesson cases. Put differently, such
equality law delegates the task of solving the conflict between belief and discrimination to
another entity, here: religious communities. It is evident that such solutions may come at the cost
of dissenters (in our cases: mostly females) within that community, and at the cost of those who
are unequal, here: women. It is thus also evident that this is not a solution.
As another example, in international law, sex equality concerns have been and are again
very likely to remain unresolved by the courts. For example, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights expressly delegates issues in education to the national level, as well as issues of family
and marriage.8 3 Politically, the latter is a victory for conservatives who seek to keep marriage
exclusively heterosexual. Whenever international law or the courts delegate issues around private
life to the national level, granting a 'margin of appreciation',84 human rights claims are rendered
non-global, thus not subject to a human rights regime, or non-European, thus left to the nation
states or to local or religious communities, thus rendered non-universal. Other examples are
discussions on family and marriage law in Great Britain and elsewhere, where some contemplate
vesting juridical power with religious communities instead of state institutions. Sex inequality,
in all these instances, becomes national, local, community-based, specific, as cultural, religious,
the other, eventually being ok. The substance of such 'cultural' relativism is however sexism,
gendered inequality." To prevent this, discussions of multi-level regulation need a thorough
analysis of the gender and other inequality dimensions.
4. Solutions?
When human rights conflict and when religion collides with sex equality, or equality with
religion, such collisions are more than mere 'cases' of 'law'. Rather, human rights are a site of
contestation. To better understand the dynamics of these and to find solutions to the conflicts at
hand, several worrisome tendencies have to be carefully considered. There is the tendency to call
everything culture, and thereby to render it positive and different, homogenous and static, and
to eventually delegate it out of reach of human rights. There is a tendency to engage in groupism,
in violation of claims to individual self-determination, which ignores the multiple characteristics,
relating to a plurality of group identities, which form a person. There is also the tendency, in law,
to interpret religious freedom as a right of such groups and the tendency to reduce sex equality
to a symmetric, rather formal principle, both of which do not adequately address the experiences
of people who bring the cases which give rise to conflicts in human rights. Finally, there is a
tendency to fetishise the law, to frame complex problems as binary clashes, to disregard multilevel regulation and the richness of norms which may inform a solution to a problem.

83 Art. 14 on the right to education states '3. The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic principles and
the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical
convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.' Art. 9 on the right
to marry and the right to found a family says: 'The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the
national laws governing the exercise of these rights.' This allows states to discriminate against homosexuals.
84 This is a doctrine associated with the European Court of Human Rights, i.e. in decisions on obscenity or pornography like Handyside v. the
United Kingdom, (5493/72) [1976] ECtHR 5 (7 December 1976). See A. J. Sweeney, 'Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the
European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era', 2005 International Comparative L. Q., p. 459; J. Schokkenbroek,
'The Prohibition of Discrimination in Article 14 of the Convention and the Margin of Appreciation', 1998 Human Rights L. J., pp. 20-36;
and contributions to 'The Doctrine ofthe Margin ofAppreciation underthe European Convention on Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory
and Application in Practice', 1998 Human Rights L.J. 1.
85 Many have provided evidence of this claim. See C. Chinkin, 'Cultural relativism and international law', in C. Howland, (ed.) Religious
fundamentalisms and the human rights ofiwomen, 2001, pp. 55-66.
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To counter these tendencies and to better address conflicts in human rights, we need
additional finesse. How can we, I asked above, peel the onion without too much crying? In
political theory, some have suggested a path of zero-tolerance regarding sex inequality.86 In the
end, that may be it, but we need to discuss the meanings of equality first. Others have argued that
some smaller conflicts of religion and equality should not be subject to the crude logics of the
law, but be subject to democratic deliberation, in a laissez-faire concept or based on a fine line
between law and politics." But who is then to decide whether harassment matters or not, whether
not getting a job in a congregation is a minor or a major problem, whether praying during school
hours (which observe Christian holidays) actually matters or not? Do public things in fact matter,
while private issues are left outside the reach of the law, fully in line with the discriminatory
history of the public-private ideology? It is in fact the subtle constellations which form the
overwhelming majority of what people experience as inequality, which is why it is called
systemic discrimination and why intent does not matter in EU indirect discrimination law.
Therefore, that proposal is not an adequate response to protect human rights. To leave some
issues to politics may be tempting to those who see the law as an adversarial case administration
only, but if we consider the multiple levels of regulation and of procedures and the governance
arrangements in which they work, then law looks much more like deliberation, like fair politics.
One can very well argue that delegation away from the law is a good idea if more people are then
empowered to deliberate, thus to equalise democracy." But as long as there is no equal agency
in such contexts, delegation is discrimination, and the law is still one option not to easily forego.
For now, then, courts need to be equipped with a more nuanced, a richer and a more
principled approach to conflicts in human rights. We need doctrine that allows us to convincingly
respond to claims of self-determination, be it religious or otherwise, and ensure equality, be it
sex equality or any other. Therefore, I suggest employing an understanding of human rights based
on equality and liberty and dignity, in a triangulated perspective of recognition." This as a
pointedly secular approach in that it presupposes human rights and allows for and requests but
rational deliberation. It endorses religious pluralism, protected by religious freedom as an
individual right which can be publicly expressed. Then, swimming lessons are about selfdetermination and, in fact, the development of agency, with cognitive, psychological and physical
features. This supports a right to learn to swim, which the state may legitimately turn into an
obligation. Also, there are equality concerns regarding boys and girls. In controversies around
clothing, both for teachers and in swimming lessons, there are notjust individual needs to express
one's religion, but also equality concerns regarding maj oritarian de-facto Christian norms (called
'secular') whose dress code is generally followed, thus privileged, and believers in other faiths,
whose dress code should be allowed, if that does not cause a further risk, like drowning. There
are also dignity concerns in that no person should be subjected to harassment, at a pool or
elsewhere. This may translate into an obligation to educate teachers and pupils, and to produce
intercultural tolerance and respect in interaction, rather than excluding girls. But girls will learn
not to drown in the water.

86 In particular, see 0. O'Neill, Bounds ofJustice, 2000 (requiring consent based on agency because without the voices ofthose concerned,
and hurt, there is no way to do justice as best as possible to all). See also W. Kymlicka, MulticulturalCitizenship, 1995, and Politicsin the
Vernacular,2001; B. Barry, Culture and Equality, 2001.
87 S. Benhabib, The Clainsof Culture:Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, 2002, Chapter 2 (arguing that 'soft patriarchy' needs to be
combated in civil society); see also J. Tully, Strange Mltiplicity, 1995; Ch. Kukathas, 'Are there any cultural rights?', 1995 PoliticalTheory,
pp. 105-139 (rejecting group rights but also state intervention).
88 Recently, Deveaux, supra note 16, Chapters 4 and 8.
89 See Baer, supra note 66.
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The swimming lessons case is, just like the prayer-room case, but one case which has
reached the courts. There are many more cases which will be and should be subject to this debate
because power inequalities call for regulated proceedings and substantive rules. Then, courts and
politics, citizens and scholars face very complex issues. I have tried to add to such complexity,
but also suggest that some analytical clarity allows us to understand the issues somewhat better.
Hopefully, this will demystify the law which often oscillates between fetish and beast in the
shadow. But also, rather than treating law as the call of the sirens,"o normative, repressive,
juridical, or just bad, as happens in some proposals to handle conflicts within human rights,
I propose to, simply, take a closer look.

90

C. Smart, Feminism and the Power ofLaw, 1989.
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